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JURISDICTION OVER VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL

LIBERTIES BY STATE GOVERNMENTS AND BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS -

The long-term security of civil liberties in the United States must in
the end depend upon the spirit and attitude of the public. Many violations of these rights never reach the stage of justiciable issues. But even
when they do, public sentiment is often reflected in the courts. Especially is this true in the state courts, which are often too near local
prejudices and entrenched mores to withstand their effect. This situation was recognized as long ago as the Reconstruction Era, when the
various civil rights acts provided for federal protection of civil liberties.
Apparently it was felt that from their slightly detached position, federal judges could take a more objective approach to the problem. This
belief has been well rewarded. The protection afforded, especially in
the Supreme Court, has been outstanding the past few years.
It becomes important, therefore, to determine just when the federal
courts will take jurisdiction in cases involving civil rights. Unfortunately for the persecuted individual, certain statutes and self-imposed
restrictions prohibit these courts from considering some violations of
civil liberties. Yet the potentialities in other directions are enormous
and remain largely unexplored.
Oppression may arise from one of three sources: (I) the federal
government or its agents; ( 2) the state governments or their agents;
(3) private individuals. The jurisdiction of the federal courts over
violation by the first of these groups is at once obvious and unqualified.
Either by way of a defense in proceedings brought to enforce a statute
or as the basis for an affirmative action by way of injunction or some
other extraordinary remedy,1 the aggrieved individual can assert his
alleged right. It is in the realm of state and individual action, however, that most oppression occurs and it is there that the controversial
aspects of federal jurisdiction arise. It is well, therefore, to examine in
detail the power of the federal courts over these two groups.
I.

Violations of Civil Rights by State Governments

(a)

Original Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts

Where local authorities and judges are apparently intent on denying civil rights, the original jurisdiction of the federal courts becomes
highly important, for the chances of a minority group securing legal
protection are far greater in the federal tribunals. The most obvious
grounds for this jurisdiction are the broad provisions of the first para1 See in general, Culp, "Methods of Attacking Unconstitutional Legislation,"
22 VA. L. REV. 723, 891 (1936); Fleischmann, "Injunctions Restraining Prosecutions Under Unconstitutional Statutes," 9 A. B. A. J. 169 (1923).
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graph of section 41 of the Judicial Code/' wherein the federal district
courts are given original jurisdiction in all cases at common law or in
equity where the controversy involves more than $3,000 and arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. But the
pecuniary requirement makes this paragraph of little utility to the individual bringing a suit against state officers to redress his civil rights,
since "There are many rights and immunities secured by the Constitution, of which freedom of speech and assembly are conspicuous examples, which are not capable of money valuation, and in many instances ... no suit in equity could be maintained for their protection if
proof of the jurisdictional amount were prerequisite." 3 There is some
authority, largely discredited, however, that because such an action
sounds in tort and the jury may award exemplary damages, the pecuniary requirement of jurisdiction is met if plaintiff claims more than
$3,000 damages in his complaint.4
In order to find a firmer basis for original jurisdiction, it is necessary
to look at some of the modern counterparts of the civil rights acts.
Broad and sweeping is the right given every citizen or person within
the United States to bring an action at law or in equity or other proper
proceeding against every person acting under color of state authority
who deprives him of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws." 5 Original jurisdiction over suits of this
character is expressly given to the district courtl? in paragraph 14 of
section 41 of the Judicial Code, regardless of the pecuniary amount
involved.6 On the surface, this paragraph overlaps paragraph I of that
2

36 Stat. L. 1091 (1911), 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 41(1).
Justice Stone, concurring, in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,
307 U.S. 496 at 529, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939).
4 This argument was set forth by Circuit Judge Biggs in Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization, (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939) 101 F. (2d) 774 at 789. But this
view was contested by the dissenting judge and by Justices Roberts and Stone in the
Supreme Court's version of the case. Justice Roberts said, 307 U. S. at 507-508: "In
suits brought under subsection (I) a traverse of the allegation as to the amount in
controversy, or a motion to dismiss based upon the absence of such amount, calls fo;
substantial proof on the part of plaintiff of facts justifying the conclusion that the suit
involves the necessary sum."
5
17 Stat. L. 13 (1871), 8 U.S. C. (1934), § 43.
ii 36 Stat. L. 1092 (1911), 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 41(14): "Of all suits at law
or in equity authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the deprivation,
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State,
of any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by the Constitution of the United States,
or of any right secured by any law of the United States providing for equal rights of
citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States." The first paragraph, 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 41(1), ends with the sentence,
"The foregoing provision as to the sum or value of the matter in controversy shall not
be construed to apply to any of the cases mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs of
this section."
8
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section and if it is read without-reference to its title-"Suits to redress
deprivation of civil rights"-it seems to cover every case falling under
section 41 ( 1) and thus to nullify the $3,000 requirement. Since this
reaches an absurd result, obviously not contemplated by Congress, the
courts have attempted to reconcile the two paragraphs on the basis of
the nature of the rights protected under each. But the decisions are far
from clear in defining what rights are within the confines of section
41 ( l 4). The following various interpretations have been made:
( 1) The Supreme Court in Carter v. Greenhaw 1 seized upon the
peculiar phrase present in section 41 ( l 4 )-"any right, privilege, or
immunity, secured by the Constitution of the United States"-as
referring to rights "directly conferred" by the Constitution. However,
no definition or clue was given as to what rights are directly conferred.
(2) The Court in Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co. 8 said that only"civil
rights" were included within 41(14), but made no attempt to define
them. The Court may have been referring to the various civil rights acts
from which 41(14) is derived. But the 1871 act defines civil rights
merely as ~hose "secured by the Constitution." 9 Therefore, this test
appears to be of no real value.
(3) One of the more popular interpretations is that given by Judge
Learned Hand in Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Pollak.10 He claimed
that section 41(14) referred to those rights which have their "origin
in the Constitution" and are therefore "secured" by it. Presumably,
such rights are to be distinguished from the category of natural rights,
which antedate the Constitution. This test would limit section 41 ( 14)
to the few vague and ill-defined rights that can be said to arise because
of the peculiar form of government created by the Constitution-such
as the right to cross state lines freely. 11 Such rights as freedom of speech
II4 u. s. 317, 5 s. Ct. 928,962 (1884).
176 U.S. 68, 20 S. Ct. 272 (1889).
9 17 Stat. L. 13 (1871), 8 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 43, 47, 48. Specific rights mentioned in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. L. 27 (1866), 8 U. S. C. (1934),-§
42, and the 1870 act, 16 Stat. L. 144 (1870), 8 U. S. C. (1934), § 41, are, of
course, thereby secured by the laws of the United States, and thus within the further
provision of 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 41(14).
10 (D. C. N. Y. 1920) 272 F. 137.
11 Justice Roberts in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S.
496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939), apparently adopts much the same position, saying in effect
that section 41 ( 14) applies to the privileges and immunities of national citizenship
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this connection, it is interesting to note that
the same phrase, "secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States," appears in
the criminal statute punishing those who conspire to deprive citizens of such rights.
One of the recent cases under this section seems to follow Judge Hand's distinction,
holding that a defendant can be punished only if he conspires to deprive a citizen of the
rights given him by the Constitution or laws. Freedom of speech and press are not
included. Powe v. United States, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) 109 F. {2d) 147.
7

8
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and press are said to originate outside the Constitution, which serves
only to protect them from encroachments by the states. The difficulty
with this test is obvious. Metaphysical theories and dogmas as to what
are and are not natural rights should not serve as the touchstones of
federal jurisdiction in such vital, practical matters.
(4) Justice Stone in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization 12 has laid down a practical and logical meaning for section 41 ( 14) :
''whenever the right or immunity is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon the infringement of property rights,
there is jurisdiction in the district court under § 24( 14) of the Judicial
Code to entertain it without proof that the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000." In other words, section 41 ( 1) embraces all suits arising
under the Constitution, including suits for deprivation of civil rights,
where the amount in controversy can be shown to exceed $3,000. On
the other hand, since civil rights suits are seldom if ever capable of
money valuation, section 41 ( 14) gives jurisdiction over them regardless of the money involved. This interpretation does some violence to
the phrase "any right, privilege, or immunity" by making it mean
"any personal or civil right, privilege, or immunity," but it is in
obvious accord with the true intent of Congress 18 and with the title
affixed to section 41 ( 14). More important, it opens up a hitherto unused broad remedy for protection of the individual. The aggrieved
plaintiff need not worry whether his right arose before or under the
Constitution. As long as it is protected against state encroachment by
the Constitution, he may enjoin the state officers or sue them for damages. Thus in the Hague case, a bill for an injunction against state
officers for violating the right of speech and assembly was allowed
under this section. The limitless possibilities of this realistic interpretation were strikingly shown in the later case of Ghadiali v. Delaware
State Medical Society,14 where a retired physician who had been delivering free public lectures was allowed to enjoin state officials who
sought to prevent him from speaking. No pecuniary damages were
12

307 U. S. 496 at 531-532, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939).
Section 41(14) was originally enacted in 1871 as a part of the Civil Rights
Act of that year, designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, which at that time
was regarded primarily as a protection of personal rather than property rights. This
was also prior to the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 (1873), which
first made the novel and unreal distinction between rights created and rights protected
by the Constitution. See, in general, 52 HARV. L. REv. n36 (1939).
14
(D. C. Del. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 841. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73, 52
S. Ct. 484 (1932), illustrates a damage action brought under this section against state
election officials for denying the right of a qualified voter to vote. But this is a rather
weak case for section 41(14), since other jurisdictional sections were cited and since
the $3,000 jurisdictional amount may have 'been present. It would seem that a suit
for $100 damages could be maintained under section 41(14).
18
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alleged. Under this interpretation it is difficult to find any jurisdictional
limitations in suits of this sort.
Of lesser importance is the right of action for damages given 15 any
person against whom any two or more individuals conspire to deprive
him of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. Such conspirators may be acting under color
of state authority, though that is not prerequisite for the action. Exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the amount of money involved, is given
the district courts over cases of this type. 16
Another possible method of- redressing deprivations of civil rights
by state officers is through the use of habeas corpus issuing from the
federal district courts. Federal courts are given the power to discharge
a prisoner who is held "in custody in violation of the Constitution or of
a law or treaty of the United States." 17 But there are two serious limitations to the use of the writ in such a case. In the first place, the federal
courts have voluntarily placed severe restrictions on the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus by holding that the only inquiry permissible is
that of jurisdiction.18 So unless the prisoner is detained where there is
no jurisdiction over the person or subject matter, he is not entitled to
a discharge. It matters not how flagrant the errors may be that are
committed in exercising the jurisdiction: such errors can be corrected
only by appeal to higher courts. In the second place, where the prisoner
is held by a state court in violation of an alleged civil right, the federal
courts are even more reluctant to grant the writ. They apparently fear
that by freeing prisoners from state courts great confusion and chaos
will mark the interrelationship of federal and state courts. This fear is
often unwarranted. Had the federal courts at the outset used the writ
as intended by Congress to enforce civil liberties, such as freedom from
race discrimination in jury service ( where the problem usually arises),
the state courts would have been forced to make their criminal procedure consistent with the federal Constitution.19 But today the rule
15

17 Stat. L. 13 (1871), 8 U.S. C. (1934), § 47(3).
36 Stat. L. 1092 (19II), 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 41(12). Note also that under
17 Stat. L. 15 (1871), 8 U. S. C. (1934), § 48, an action for damages is given against
anyone who knows that the wrongs conspired to be done in violation of 8 U. S. C.
(1934), § 47 are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing such acts, neglects or refuses to do so. If death occurs because of such refusal,
the legal representatives may recover up to $5,000. Exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of
the amount involved, is given the district courts in 36 Stat. L. 1092 (1911), 28
U.S. C. (1934), § 41(13).
17
14 Stat. L. 385 (1867), 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 453.
18
See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 at 375 (1879); In re Wood, 140 U.S.
278, II S. Ct. 738 (1890); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 15 S. Ct. 389 (1895).
19 The power to issue the writ where the person is held "in custody in violation
of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States" was originally passed by
16

1940

J

COMMENTS

is that even constitutional errors committed by state courts must be
redressed by appeal rather than by habeas corpus in the federal courts.
In extreme cases, however, the writ may be issued to challenge state
action when a constitutional issue is raised and no other remedy is
available.20 Such writ may then be obtained from any federal court,
including the Supreme Court.
Habeas corpus has also issued out of federal courts where labor
organizers have been detained without charges by state militia after
the governor had unjustifiably declared martial law. 21 Early cases held
that the governor's decision in such a situation could never be reviewed,
but Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court in Sterling v. Constantin,22 said that this was a proper subject for judicial inquiry by an
appropriate proceeding like an injunction or a writ of habeas corpus.
Otherwise, "the fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of
the United States, would be the supreme law of the land."
Another possibility, seldom if ever used in civil liberties cases, is an
injunction in the federal courts restraining state criminal proceedings.
The use of an injunction in such a case is so severely restricted and the
quaint idea that equity will restrain criminal proceedings only to protect "property rights" is so strong that little assistance is given the protection of civil rights. 23

(b)

Removal Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts

When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is begun in any state
court against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the "judicial tribunals of the state" any right secured to him by any law proCongress as part of the enabling legislation of the Fourteenth Amendment. "It is
because the Supreme Court has failed to give full effect to the enabling legislation
enacted by Congress, that the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment have been
partially nullified, and Negroes continue to have a difficult time enforcing their civil
rights." Jefferson, "Race Discrimination in Jury Service," 19 Bos-r. UNIV. L. REv.
413 at 447 (1939).
20
See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340 (1935). But in Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 27 S. Ct. I I I (1906), the Court refused to review by
habeas corpus a detention on a charge of murder, although the accused claimed that
they had been extradited under circumstances that denied them any chance to test the
lawfulness of the proceedings. For recent cases where writs have been granted to
review state decisions, see Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, (C. C. A. 6th, 1938)
97 F. (2d) 335; Howard v. Dowd, (D. C. Ind. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 844. Contra, see
McLeod v. Majors, (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 128; United States ex rel.
Jorczak v. Ragen, (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 184.
21
United States ex rel. Palmer v. Adams, (D. C. Colo. 1927) 26 F. (2d) 141.
22
287 U. S. 378 at 397, 53 S. Ct. 190 (1932).
23
See Fleischmann, "Injunctions Restraining Prosecutions Under Unconstitutional
Statutes," 9 A. B. A. J. 169 (1923); Warren, "Federal and State Court Interference,"
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viding for the equal civil rights of United States citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, such suit or prosecution may, on the defendant's petition, be removed to the nearest
federal district court.24 The right to petition for removal is limited to
the defendant, and in criminal suits may be exercised only after the bill
of indictment in a prosecution has been found in the state court. The
case must be removed before the trial or :final hearing of the cause in
the state court. If the defendant is in actual custody, he must seek a
writ of habeas corpus.cum causa.25 No jurisdictional amount is needed in
the civil cases removed. The civil rights that must be found to be impaired before removal is allowed are those within the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the original purpose of the
removal section was to give these rights protection in federal courts.
Mere prejudice is not enough to warrant removal. Usually the situation
justifying removal involves racial discrimination in the choice of jurors
in the criminal prosecution of a negro. But the statute applies to whites
and negroes alike. Thus, cases have arisen involving exclusion of Republicans from a jury trying a white man,26 and alleged denial of a
right of peremptory challenge in a trial involving a white man. 21
Removal is provided for whenever the defendant is (I) denied or
( 2) unable to enforce his civil rights in the state court. There are three
possible situations where the defendant may seek to remove:
(I) Where removal is sought immediately after the indictment and
the state law is itself discriminatory in choice of jurors. This is clearly
within the statute and removal will be granted.28 It is presumed here
that the state courts will abide by and be bound by the unconstitutional
state statute. Hence defendant falls within the second class-he is
unable to enforce his civil rights.
( 2) Where removal is sought immediately after the indictment
because of discriminatory acts by jury officials in selecting jurors under
a valid state law. This is held not to state a case for removal. While
the Fourteenth Amendment protects one against discriminatory action
by any agency of the state, the removal statute is available only when
43' HARV. L. REV. 3'45 (1930); Taylor and Willis, "The Power of Federal Courts
to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts.," 42 YALE L. J. 1169 (1933); 4 DuKE
B. A. J. 26 (1936).
24 16 Stat. L. 144 (1870), 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 74.
25 36 Stat. L. 1097 (1911), 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 75. Where the state court
refuses to deliver certified copies of the record, the federal court may proceed by
affidavits. 36 Stat. L. xo98 (1911), 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 78.
28 Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 26 S. Ct. 387 (1906).
'21 People of California v. Lamson, (D. C. Cal. (1935), 12 F. Supp. 813, (C. C.
A. 9th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 388.
28 Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313 (1879).
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the discrimination is by the "judicial tribunals of the state." 29 At the
time the petition is filed here, the state court has not yet acted and
defendant is said not yet to be denied his rights nor unable to enforce
them. It is assumed that the state court will correct the wrong if defendant moves to quash the indictment or panel. It is also well settled
that the illegal action of the officials alone does not make a case for
removal. 80
(3) Where removal is sought after the trial court has erroneously
denied a motion to quash the indictment based on discriminatory action
by the jury officials acting under a valid state law. This would seem
to fall squarely within the wording of the statute, since by denying
defendant's motion, the state court has denied him his civil rights. It
should be no answer that defendant may have this injury remedied by
appealing to the state appellate courts, for the statute gives him the
right to remove regardless of other alternatives. Yet the courts have
not followed such a logical path. In Kentucky v. Powers,81 the Supreme
Court held that a trial court's erroneous ruling on defendant's motion
did not state a case for removal, on the ground that there must be discrimination by the state Constitution or laws; the remedy lies in appeal
to higher state courts and finally to the Supreme Court. And in Gibson
v. Mississippi, 82 the Court said the removal statute did not embrace the
case where a right was denied by judicial action during a trial, or in the
sentence, or in the mode of executing the sentence; the remedy in all
such cases was by appeal.
It would thus appear that by judicial interpretation, most of the
substance of the removal statute has been extracted and the defendant
is left in the precarious position of having to appeal through the slow
and expensive hierarchy of courts. Only if the statute of the state
discriminates against him are his rights said to be denied or unenforceable. Such a narrow, twisted meaning can be traced back to an unfortunate remark in two early cases 88 that the removal statute refers
29

Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 at 321 (1879).
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S.
565, 16 S. Ct. 904 (1896); Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U. S. 101, 16 S. Ct. 990
(1896).
31 201 u. s. I, 26 s. Ct. 387 (1906).
82 162 U. S. 565, 16 S. Ct. 904 (1896). See also Commonwealth v. Millen, 289
Mass. 441, 194 N. E. 463 (1935).
88 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1879); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370
(1880). The Neal case involved only action by jury officials; while the Rives case did
involve judicial action prior to the petition, it actually held that a defendant had no
right under federal law or Constitution to have a mixed jury in a particular trial. A
good discussion of these cases is contained in the lower court decision in Kentucky v.
Powers, (C. C. Ky. 1905) 139 F. 452. See also, Jefferson, "Race Discrimination in
Jury Service," 19 BoST. UNIV. L. REV. 413 (1939), and annotations in 53 L. R. A.
568 (1901) and 52 A. L. R. 919 (1928).
80
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"primarily, if not exclusively" to a legislative denial of rights. Yet,
as often occurs, neither case was real authority for that position. The
presumptions indulged in to justify this result are unrealistic and illogical. It is presumed that when the denial is by the jury officials, the state
court will correct the error on a motion to quash the indictment. Yet
when local sentiment is running strongly against a defendant, the state
courts often do not bother to upset the indictment on the basis of a
denial of civil rights. Removal may be quite essential here for a fair
trial. On the other hand, when the state statute discriminates, it is
presumed that the state courts will follow the invalid law and hence
removal is necessary. This is contrary to the well-settled proposition
that state courts are bound to follow the Constitution of the United
States in all respects. Why presume otherwise in this particular situation?
A sensible solution would be to follow the apparent intent of Congress-which was to allow removal whenever state action is so discriminatory that a fair trial cannot be had. "State action" for this purpose should include the situation where a statute discriminates or the
action of officials is likely to affect the trial, or the trial court's ruling
denies defendant his civil rights in the trial. The federal courts should
not be too tender in their regard for the state courts and their processes
when vital liberties of individuals are at stake.

( c) Appellate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
The vast majority of cases involving civil liberties wend their way
through the various state courts and then are reviewed by the United
'States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari or by writ of appeal. It is
usually claimed that some state statute or other state action violates a
right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Concerning such
jurisdiction there is no controversy. There is a question, however,
whether the Supreme Court may review decisions of state courts that
in themselves deny a person civil rights, such as a state court's decision,
in the absence of statute, denying the right to strike or to assemble. No
case has ever passed on this question directly, although there are several
cases -pending in the present term of Court that may put an end to
this doubt. 3311 It is clear that the refusal of a state court to hear a claim
3311 Certiorari has already been granted in two cases by the Supreme Court where
the Illinois court enjoined picketing despite objections that this violated the freedom
of speech guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. No Illinois statute prescribed such
result. Swing v. American Federation of Labor, 372 Ill. 91, 22 N. E. (2d) 857 (1939),
cert. granted 310 U. S. 620, 60 S. Ct. 1081 (1940); Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v.
Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N. E. (2d) 308 (1939), cert.
granted, 310 U. S. 655, 60 S. Ct. 1092 (1940). In another similar case, Crosby v.
Rath, 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N. E. (2d) 934 (1940), certiorari is still pending in the
Supreme Court (Docket No. 187, October term, 1940).
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that the state is denying the claimant the equal protection of the laws by
subjecting him to unequal taxation is "state action" reviewable by the
Supreme Court. 84 It would seem reasonable that a state court decision
actually denying the civil rights of an individual is equally "state
action." State courts have no privilege to crush these rights any more
than have the state legislatures or executive officials.
2.

Violations of Civil Rights by Individuals

The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were undoubtedly intended by their framers to cover actions by individuals as well as by
states. The legislation declared invalid in the Civil Rights Cases 35 is
partial proof of this. It was specifically so stated as to the Fifteenth
Amendment by Senator Howard, one of the framers. 86 But the wording
of the amendments unfortunately related only to state action, and the
courts were quick to solidify that meaning. The result has been that
many of the most flagrant violations of civil liberty escape unpunished. 37
Obviously, the federal courts have jurisdiction over civil actions
brought by individuals against other individuals who have deprived
them of their civil liberties by the use of force or threats, provided there
is more than $3,000 involved and provided there is diversity of citizenH Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi, 286 U. S. 276, 52 S. Ct.
556 (1932). Justice Stone, 286 U. S. at 282, says, "But the Constitution, which
guarantees rights and immunities to the citizen, likewise insures to him the privilege of
having those rights and immunities judicially declared and protected when such judicial
action is properly invoked. Even though the claimed constitutional protection be denied
on non-federal grounds, it is the province of this Court to inquire whether the decision
of the state court rests upon a fair or substantial basis. If unsubstantial, constitutional
obligations may not be thus avoided. • •• his constitutional rights are denied as well
by the refusal of the state court to decide the question, as by an erroneous decision of
it." See also cases cited in Smith and DeLancey, "The State Legislatures and Unionism,"
38 M1cH. L. REv. 987 at 1012, note 83b (1940).
85 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883).
86 CoNG. GLoBE, 41st Cong., 2d sess. (1870), pp. 3654-3655. Compare Senator
Thurman's speech, id., pp. 3661-3662.
87 As one commentator has put it: "So long as the Supreme Court adheres to the
principle that Congress can prohibit only state and not individual action, the
effective protection of civil liberties rests with the states. Our history has shown that
the states cannot always be relied on to play their part. The greatest infringements of
personal rights come not from direct state action, but from private forces which the state
is unwilling to check. The recent disclosures before the LaFollette Committee make this
abundantly clear. No effective restriction is possible on the fascism today rampant in
sections of Alabama, California, and Kentucky, to mention only the most conspicuous
instances, without federal intervention. It is important, therefore, that Congress be
given power to punish interference with personal rights by private agencies, as well as
by state action." Fraenkel, "One Hundred and Fifty Years of the Bill of Rights," 23
MINN. L. REV. 719 at 771-772 (1939).

2
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ship. But that jurisdiction o:ffers little protection, so seldom are its
requirements met.
There are, however, several statutory grounds on which the federal
government may bring actions against individuals who violate the
civil rights of others, in spite of the limitations of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. One of these is the provision that any officer
or person charged with the duty of selecting or summoning jurors who
fails to summon any citizen because of race or color or previous condition of servitude is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not
more than $5,000. 88 But this has been used only once-against a state
judge in 1879 in Ex parte Virginia. 89 Otherwise, it has remained a dead
letter, in spite of the further provision 40 making it the duty of the
United States district attorneys, marshals, deputy marshals, commissioners, and other officers to initiate all prosecutions in vindication of
civil liberties.
Of far greater importance and potentialities are the two criminal
sectionsn---sections 51 and 52 of the Criminal Code. Section 51 provides that if two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten,
or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right
or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, they shall be fined not more than $5,000 and 'imprisoned not
more than ten years and shall thereafter be ineligible for any office or
place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
At first glance, section 51 seems anomalous. It was passed originally
to help enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. True, the Fifteenth Amendment applies only to state action, while section 5 I is directed toward
action by two or more individuals. However, the courts were astute in
surmounting this difficulty. The validity of section 51 does not now
depend upon the Fifteenth Amendment. Rather it depends upon the
theory fabricated out of whole cloth in the Slaughterhouse Cases.u
According to this theory there are a certain number of rights or privileges said to be conferred upon United States citizens by the United
Stat'es Constitution and laws thereunder, rights that are essential to
the working of the particular form of government set up. Since any
government that creates rights must be able to enforce them, section
5 I is said to be an appropriate statute for that purpose. Thus, whenever
the federal government seeks to prosecute anyone under section 51,
the courts will ask themselves these wordy questions: 48
I8 Stat. L. 336 (1875), 8 U. S. C. (1934), § 44.
U.S. 339 (1879).
40 16 Stat. L. 142 (1870), 8 U. S. C. (1934), § 49.
41 35 Stat. L. 1092 (1909), 18 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 51, 52.
42 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 (1873).
48 United States v. Moore, (C. C. Ala. 1904) 129 F. 630 at 632.
88

89 IOO
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"ls the right or privilege claimed granted in terms by any provision of the Constitution, or so appropriate and necessary to the
enjoyment of any right or privilege which the Constitution does
specify and confer upon citizens of the United States as to arise
by necessary implication? Is its exercise necessary or appropriate
in the performance of any of the duties which the Constitution and
laws of the United States exact from its citizens? Is its protection
by federal authority needful to the just supremacy of the general
government over any matter committed to it, or directly conservative or promotive of any of the ends for which the Constitution
ordained the government of the United States? If the character
of the right or privilege claimed does not permit affirmative
answer to any of these inquiries, it is clear the right is not derived
from or dependent on the Constitution, and its protection is not
committed to the general government."
In effect, the rights protected under section 5r are those rights that
are said to be privileges and immunities of national citizenship under
the Fourteenth Amendment. While the category of privileges and immunities has never been concretely defined under the Fourteenth
Amendment, there are innumerable examples where the federal government has successfully prosecuted individuals under section 5 r for
denying others certain privileges of citizenship. These judicially determined privileges include the right to vote for federal officers in both
primary and regular elections,44 the right of public officers to perform
their federal duties,45 the right of one in custody of a federal official to
be free from lawless violence,46 and the right to inform officers of
violations of federal laws.47
On the other hand, it is said that the rights of free speech and press,
when not tied up in some way with maintaining a federal right in its
integrity, are not within the meaning of section 5 r. And so a circuit
court of appeals held in a recent case: 48
"Because the federal government is a republican one in which the
will of the people ought to prevail, and because that will ought to
44 Many of the Pendergast machine prosecutions were brought under this section.
See Luteran v. United States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 395; Little v. United
States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 401; Walker v. United States, (C. C. A.
8th, 1937) 93 F. (2d) 383.
45 United States v. Patrick, (C. C. Tenn. 1893) 54 F. 338; United States v.
David, (C. C. Tenn. 1900) 103 F. 457; McDonald v. United States, (C. C. A.
8th, 1925) 9 F. (2d) 506.
48 Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 12 S. Ct. 617 (1892).
41 Motes v. United States, 178 U. S. 458, 25 S. Ct. 993 (1900); In re Quarles,
158 U.S. 532, 15 S. Ct. 959 (1895).
48 Powe v. United States, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) I09 F. (2d) 147 at 151, noted in
40 CoL. L. REV. 902 (1940).
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be expressive of an informed public opinion, the freedom of
speaking and printing on subjects relating to that government, its
elections, its laws, its operations and its officers is vital to it. Assuming that for this reason Congress, if it finds it necessary, can legislate to maintain such freedom in that field, it does not follow that
Congress can legislate generally to preserve such freedom in
discussing religious affairs, or social or artistic matters, or matters
of purely State concern."
It was also argued in vain in this case that the clause in the Constitution
guaranteeing each state a republican form of government gave the
federal government power to protect even as against individuals free
expression on those matters which might become election issues. 49
The most important trend at the present time under section 5 I is to
emphasize the rights given citizens under the laws and statutes of the
United States rather than under the Constitution. The civil liberties
division of the department of justice has already obtained several indictments on this basis. 50 If carried out to its logical conclusion, this
trend has far-reaching and serious consequences. Thus an employer
could be prosecuted for conspiring with other company officials to deny
employees the right given them to organize under the Wagner Act,
thereby providing criminal sanctions that are not found in the act
itself.51 There is some authority for such a result. In United States v.
Waddell 5 2 it was held that persons could be prosecuted under section
5 I for conspiring to prevent a person from entering a homestead
granted to him under the federal homestead laws. More pertinent to
the Wagner Act is the case of Pennsylvania Railroad System and Allied
Lines Federation No. 90 v. Pennsylvania R. R.,5 3 holding that under
the I 920 Transportation Act, a union could not get a prosecution under
section 5 I against the railway and its officers mainly because the act
was enforceable in its labor provisions only through publication and
public opinion. Had it been enforceable in the courts, the implication
is that section 51 would apply. Just what the boundaries are to such an
application of section 5 I is not known. Perhaps it might apply to any
49

Se~ 40 CoL. L. REv. 902 (1940).
Rogge, "Justice and Civil Liberties," 25 A. B. A. J. 1030 (1939).
51 This was the basis used to secure the indictment in the notorious 'Harlan County
case, later dismissed by agreement. Also, the federal grand jury in Savannah, Georgia,
recently returned an indictment charging a textile firm, its officers, and eleven individuals with conspiring to deprive employees of their rights under the Wagner Act.
After the National Labor Relations Board had certified a union, the defendants were
alleged to have entered into a conspiracy to reduce the pay, shut down the mill, prevent
union meetings, etc., all in violation of the statutory rights of the employees.
52
112 U.S. 76, 5 S. Ct. 35 (1884).
53
267 U.S. 203, 4-5 S. Ct. 307 (1925).
50
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rights given citizens under a federal statute. Or, in more accord with
the purpose and title of section 5r, it may apply only to the personal
and civil rights given citizens under such laws. It is limited, of course,
to citizens who are deprived of their liberties and cannot be directed
against anti-alien activities.
Section 52 is far more limited in scope. Its title relates to those
acting under color of state laws, but the original statute and the actual
language of the statute today refer to those acting under color of any
laws. But inasmuch as the framers had in mind state action, this limitation is probably correct, though an argument could be made that it
applies to federal officers. Even so, however, it is limited to punishing
those who, under color of any law, ordinance, etc., subject inhabitants
of any state to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States
on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color
or race. This section has never been before a court, but it is probably
limited only to those officers who deny civil rights to persons because
they are aliens or negroes. No conspiracy need be shown. The department of justice feels that this section is inapplicable to most civil liberties
cases and that since most cases involving officers contain elements of
conspiracy such officers can be included in an indictment under section 5r.
From this survey of the major fields of jurisdiction of the federal
courts over violations of civil liberties can be seen the fact that the
potential scope of federal power is far greater than is usually supposed
or than might be expected under time-worn statutes. From these hidden
wells of jurisdiction, much can be done in the future to protect these
vital liberties if counsel for the aggrieved individual is alert and if the
government is aggressive in its prosecutions.
Eugene Gressman

